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Bonds of love or bonds of blood? 
-children on the borderline of social and natural kinship- 
 
Ι. Introduction 
 
The kinship relation between a child and his/her genetic parents constitutes 
the primary legal bond of every natural person, which is defined by law (ex lege) 
through provisions of peremptory norm that cannot be by-passed or modified by the 
personal volition of the persons in question, meaning that they are not subject to 
agreements between the persons involved. Of course the volition of the father always 
proves of definitive significance for the establishment of a family in voluntary 
acknowledgement, however, on the all too clear condition that there exists a blood 
relation between the father and the child, which means that the man explicitly 
declaring his will is indeed the biological father of the child, otherwise the law 
provides for the possibility of voluntary acknowledgement contestation (1477 CC). 
Concerning the establishment of kinship between a child and their father and 
mother the civil code, even today, looks back to primordial rules and uses the legal 
technique of presumptions1. Through their reliance on legal presumptions nature and 
law are intertwined in a harmonious way, and have been doing so since the times of 
Roman law. For law to provide an answer to the question of what fatherhood is and 
what motherhood is it resorts to the bipole of  n a t u r e / l a w, stipulating that labour, 
which is nature in the act, indicates motherhood as a rule (matter semper certa est), 
while fatherhood is denoted through marriage as a rule (..pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstant -the father is demonstrated by marriage). In other words, the legal 
presumptions of articles 1465 and 1466 CC, are based on marriage and stipulate that it 
is the husband of the mother, when she is married, that is the father of the child while 
                                                          
1 Presumptions of law constitute a legislative technique whereby the legislator is led to a conclusion by 
a real fact (a natural fact like childbirth or a legal fact like marriage). Presumptions of law are 
distinguished in rebuttable and irrebuttable, depending on whether it is allowed to question a given 
presumption and use due proof in doing so and are conceptually different from judicial presumptions of 
fact. See Ν. Paisidou, Judicial presumptions in civil litigation cases, PhD Thesis (1991), p. 51 et seq. 
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when the mother is unmarried the legislator tries to identify fatherhood by using the 
presumption of sexual intercourse. Therefore, under article 1481 of the Civil Code it 
is stipulated that when a child is born to an unmarried woman the father is the man 
with whom the woman had had sexual contact with during the crucial period of 
conception, even if this had happened for only a single time. 
The presumptions concerning the kinship of a child with the father emanate 
from self-explanatory and logical assumptions, such as the fact the the child born 
inside a marriage is the offspring of the woman that gave birth to him/her (1465 CC) 
or that the child born while the mother is not married has as a father the man with 
whom the woman had a sexual relationship with during the crucial time of the 
conception (1481 CC). These primordial rules are based on the different biological 
nature of men and women, respectively. In other words, in kinship law we can 
observe a primary connection between law and nature, where the law, which alludes 
to marriage, defines fatherhood as a rule, while nature, i.e. labour, defines 
motherhood as a rule2. 
The recent3 law about assisted reproduction has given, however, the spouses, 
registered partners and partners living together without marriage or civil agreement, 
as well as to single women, the ability to have children through medical assistance, 
namely three new ways of assisted reproduction: by means of third party genetic 
material (1456 §1 par.b, 1460, 1475 § 2) after their death (post-mortem fertilization, 
1457 CC) or surrogacy (gestation by another woman, 1458 CC). The basic 
requirement for this radical change in kinship law is the consent of the parties 
involved.  
The pre-requisite for this radical change in the law of kinship lies in the 
consent of the stakeholders. In other words, the law acknowledges the autonomy of 
natural persons who may wish to have a child with no sexual intercourse but through 
in vitro fertilization and due consent is acknowledged as the establishing cause for 
this exception, which is why this kinship is called socio-emotional kinship.  
The legitimizing reason behind this divergence from the natural rule of sexual 
intimacy, provided for under law 3089/2002, is the inability to have children in the 
                                                          
2 Cf. Μ. Μaropoulou, The artificial womb, Nea Estia Publ, 9/ 2010, p.299. 
3 The 3089/ 2002 law is characterised as recent compared to the two-thousand old single regulation of 
kinship of the civil code, especially in what concerns the mother, for whom kinship has been 
established exclusively through childbirth according to the Roman rule of matter semper certa est (the 
mother is always certain), which is an axiom that was questioned only recently through the legislation 
of surrogacy. 
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natural way, i.e. the existence of a medical inability to procreate. These two basic 
requirements, - (a) the consent of the parties involved and (b) the inability to procreate 
naturally -, render the introduction of private autonomy in family law consistent with 
the constitution -according to the pertinent 3357/2010 ruling of the Athens Court of 
Appeals (Annals of Private Law Review ΙΓ/2013.508).  
The legislator of law 3089/2002, who was called upon to regulate medically 
assisted reproduction for the very first time, stipulated limits and requirements 
concerning the permissibility of medical intervention. In other words, the legislator 
specified the necessary conditions on which private autonomy can lead to the 
establishment of kinship between a child and his/her parents, when the child is not 
their biological offspring. However, despite the fact that the law was quite permissive 
or liberal, as it is usually said, the kinship between the child and the parents cannot be 
established on the grounds of the initiative or volition of the parents  to undergo 
medically assisted reproduction, if the legal requirements governing MAR are not 
abided by. Therefore, what is medically possible is not necessarily legally 
permissible- or incidentally- socially desirable. 
Apart from the above guiding principles governing the law of medically assisted 
reproduction, there exist some other, more specialised requirements, such as the age 
of the persons seeking assistance, the type of the consent granted and, most 
importantly, the court permission, which is required in the cases of post-mortem 
fertilization and surrogacy. Therefore, the problems in establishing kinship can occur: 
first and foremost, when there is no due consent of the parties involved or there is no 
medical need or when there is no judicial permission for either post-mortem 
fertilization or surrogacy. In these cases we could say, first of all, that since the legal 
requirements do not apply no kinship can be established between the child and the 
social parents but only with the genetic parents, and the novelty in medically assisted 
reproduction is that it is possible that no kinship can be established between the child  
and the mother herself, as it so happens in the two cases I shall present to you, both of 
which regard surrogacy, one on behalf of the grandmother and the other on behalf of 
a single, unmarried man.  
It should be mentioned, however, that when cases where legal requirements had 
not been abided by ended up in court, the judge proved extremely lenient in what 
concerns due compliance, as it so happened in the case where the court granted 
judicial permission for surrogate pregnancy when in fact the fertilized eggs had 
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already been transferred in the womb of the surrogate mother4, which is something 
that is not permitted, or also when the court granted permission for post-mortem 
fertilization while there was no notarial deed containing the consent of the deceased, 
but the only thing that existed was the statement of the deceased in a hand-written will 
and testament (which was not written by a notary public)5, obviously in the light of 
the adverse consequences for the child in case the petition was rejected on the grounds 
of de facto events.  
However, the dispute of social kinship occurs mainly when a cumulative 
combination of many forms of in vitro fertilization is endeavoured, i.e when it is 
attempted to cumulatively and concurrently apply all three forms of assisted 
reproduction- as it so happens when we have surrogacy through heterologous 
fertilization or post-mortem fertilization with surrogacy, heterologous fertilization 
without due paternal consent or fertilization of a single woman with the sperm of a 
known third party donor etc.  
In the absence of legal requirements the natural bond between the child and the 
mother is determined only through labour, thereby the child's mother is the woman 
that “gives birth” to him/her and this applies mainly to illegal surrogacy. According to 
some opinions, demonstarting the fact that in science there is no consensus over the 
matter, surrogacy should be allowed only when the eggs come from the very woman 
that wants to have the child6 or it should be allowed only in the event of medical 
inability of the woman to procreate7 and that it should not be allowed for men, 
respectively8 or it should be permitted only for fertilization during a person's life  and 
not post mortem9, while the second opinion accepts that it can be performed post 
mortem for the surviving man-spouse10, while post mortem fertilization can also be 
heterologous11, on condition that there exists a due notarial consent already.  
                                                          
4 Thessaloniki CoFI 27035/2003 Armenopoulos journal 58(2004). 225. 
5 Athens CoFI 5146/2007 EfAD legal journal 3(2010). 940 with comments by Th. Trokanas. 
6 Κoutsouradis, Surrogacy topics, Hon Vol for Ioannis Manoledakis, 858/9. 
7 See Papadopoulou-Klamari, Kinship (2010), p. 223` Κotzabasi, Equality of genders and private 
autonomy (2011), p. 145` Pandelidou, Equal treatment and medical assistance in human reproduction, 
EfAD legal journal 2001/3.243(247). 
8 In favour of acknowledging this possibility for men, too, see Κounougeri- Μanoledaki, commentary 
on the 2827/2008ruling of the one member Athens CoFI, IDB, issue 9/2010` Papachristou, comments 
on the same ruling, Annals of Private Law, Θ/2009.818` Κoumoutzis in the Georgiadis- Stathopoulos 
CC, articles 1457-1458 no. 79. 
9 Papachristou, Family Law practice manual, p.216.  
10 Κounougeri -Manoledaki, Family Law5 ΙΙ, p. 57. 
11 Papachristou, Family Law Practice manual, p. 216. That it has to be homologous, vide. Κounougeri- 
Μanoledaki, Family Law, p. 21 
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The questionable cases are bound to lead to the birth of a child whose kinship 
relations will be in dispute, which means that these children are on the borderline 
between social and natural kinship. However, it is unanimously accepted that post 
mortem fertilization and surrogacy without the necessary court permission cannot 
establish kinship between the child and the social parents. The issue of non-
compliance with the strict requirements, especially the court permission for surrogacy 
and post mortem fertilization, according to consensus of opinions, leads to the 
inability to establish kinship with the social mother and, by consequence, to the 
subsequent kinship with the social father while in the post mortem cases it leads to the 
inability to establish kinship with the deceased father. This means that since the 
requirements stipulated under articles 1457 and 1458 CC are not complied with, the 
consequences provided for under articles 1465 §2 and 1464 CC do not apply.  
In fact, it is claimed that gestation by another woman with no court permission 
cannot even lead to later stage adoption of the child by the social parents because this 
would in fact constitute a blatant violation of the provisions regulating assisted 
reproduction12. Therefore, in effect it is questionable whether the child born through 
in vitro fertilization can actually be adopted at a later stage by his/her very social 
parents. 
The novelty in in vitro fertilization in the case of illegal reproduction is, for all 
intents and purposes, that in fact it may prove impossible to establish either a social 
or a natural kinship of the child not only with the father but also with the mother 
as well, as it finally happened in the above two cases that were tried by the Greek 
courts. 
The issue of the children who are devoid of kinship is not simple at all; in fact it 
is a complicated legal matter mainly for the child born, since the establishment of a 
child's kinship relations I believe constitutes a human right on the basis of the 
constitutional protection of human dignity (article 2 C), childhood (article 21 C) and 
private life (article 9 C, article 8 ECHR) but also on the basis of the right of children 
to family life, which is guaranteed under article  8 of the International Convention for 
the Rights of Children.   
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the natural fact of child labour is a 
fundamental fact both for the connection of the child with the mother (kinship) and 
                                                          
12 See Papachristou, In vitro fertilization, p. 76` contr. Κounougeri- Manoledaki, Family law5 ΙΙ, p. 
101/2`, by the same author, surrogacy and adoption, p. 168.  
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for the relation of the child with the state (citizenship) either through the mother, 
under the law of blood relation, or through the birthplace. Labour, as an indisputable 
natural fact is a fact establishing both kinship and nationality. Therefore the breach of 
surrogacy requirements , whenever and wherever surrogacy is permitted, leads at the 
same time to problems pertinent to both family law and nationality law.  
 The birth of a child abroad through the use of a surrogate mother has repeatedly 
concerned many countries quite extensively, especially those counties which do not 
provide for the practice of surrogacy, such as France and Germany. Aiming at 
safeguarding prohibition these countries did not permit either the registration of the 
children in question in public registries or the acquisition of citizenship for the 
children of French or German nationals who were born abroad (Ukraine, India, 
America or Greece) through a surrogate mother, even though the cases involved 
couples where the woman was medically unable to carry the child herself, something 
which is by all means permitted for us. So it was decided that the children born to 
surrogates abroad are not to be granted German citizenship status or registered in 
registries as their own children13. This issue generated a long discussion and recently 
led to the sentence of France by the ECJ (Menesson versus France) thereby obliging 
France to allow the registration in the registry office of the child born abroad (through 
surrogacy) and was the biological child of a French woman (blood relation)- which is 
an issue that I believe Mr Trokanas will present- and I think that it will also concern 
the European legal order soon. 
 
ΙΙ. A case of surrogacy and post mortem fertilization that took place abroad 
(Russia) on behalf of the grandmother, who was a permanent resident of Greece and 
in the case of whom the requirements of articles 1457- 1458 CC were not complied 
with and later adoption of the children by herself (One member CoFI of Thessaloniki 
7013/2013 Armenopoulos journal 2013.1291). 
The Thessaloniki Court of First Instance was faced with a case of illegal 
surrogacy and illegal post mortem fertilization at the same time. It concerned a 
woman, a doctor by profession, permanent resident of Greece and originally from 
Russia who worked in Greece (Thessaloniki) as a Technological Educational Institute 
teacher. The woman in question, because of her son's death and before actual death 
                                                          
13 16-7 CC-French CC. “Every contract which regards substitution or surrogacy by third parties is null 
and void” in : Βioethics, http: //www.bioethics.gr 
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following a road accident, retrieved her son's sperm (illegally) and then went to 
Russia where she used two surrogate mothers and as a result had four grandchildren 
(three boys and a girl). Then she tried to be acknowledged as the mother of the 
children in Greece but since this proved impossible she went to Russia anew, where 
by Court ruling of the Moscow Court she adopted the four children. Then she came to 
Greece again and asked the Court to acknowledge the adoption ruling of the foreign 
court, which stipulates that she is the foster mother of these children, so that the ruling 
could also be valid in Greece (article 28, law 12452/1983).  
The Thessaloniki Court14 of First Instance rejected the petition to acknowledge 
a foreign court adoption decision on the grounds that it contravenes the Greek public 
order, because the children were born to surrogate mothers and post mortem 
fertilization and at the same time the legal requirements had not been abided by. This 
applied because (a) there was no consent of the deceased person (son of the foster 
mother) for post mortem fertilization, not even a simple written consent, (b) she 
herself was not a woman/ mother who wanted to have children but their biological 
grandmother, who was already 58 years old and therefore she had exceeded the legal 
age eligible for medically assisted reproduction, (c) there was no court permission for 
either surrogacy or post mortem fertilization, and (d) -and perhaps most importantly-, 
there had been full substitution in gestation, that is the eggs came from the surrogate 
mothers, which is a fact that is strictly prohibited under the Greek civil code. In other 
words the surrogate gestation that took place in Russia was in full contravention with 
Greek public order, mainly because the sperm donor had never been either a husband 
or a partner of the mother while surrogacy was full, meaning that the surrogate 
mothers actually donated their own eggs. 
After all, according to the relevant documents submitted to court it was judged 
that the adoption itself also contravened the Greek public order, since from the 
adoption certificates it came out that on them the name of the mother written down 
was that of their biological grandmother and her son was registered as their biological 
father. This adoption ruling, which was registered as unappealable in the Moscow 
Registry was considered by the Thessaloniki Court to be in total contravention of  the 
Greek public order, because “...it would stake the systematic and evaluative unity 
both of family law and of  private law in general... ” and runs contrary to “commonly 
                                                          
14 Thessaloniki one-member CoFI, 7013/ 2013. 1291 
                                                          Bonds of love or bonds of blood? 
 
232 
accepted mentalities which have been invariably governing and regulating living 
relations in Greece..”. Thus in this way the adoption remained deficient(it is valid 
only in Russia) and for the first time ever- in Greece too- there was a line drawn in 
illegal surrogate gestation.  
 
ΙΙΙ. The second case that was brought before the Greek courts was related again 
to surrogacy but that time commissioned by a man (One member CoFI of Athens 
2827/2008, Nomiko Vima Hellenic Law Review 2012.1437`, One member CoFI of 
Thessaloniki 13707/2009 Annals of Private Law 2011.267` Athens CoA 3357/2010 
Annals of Private Law ΙΓ/2013.508 `). 
The Court of First Instance of Athens and the Thessaloniki CoFi, with two 
identical rulings in terms of rationale granted permission for surrogacy to two 
different single, unmarried men upon their request, thereby establishing their right to 
medical assistance, since they were infertile by analogy of law. That is, based on the 
principle of equality among citizens before the law and also in accordance with the 
principle of gender equality, since the right of access to medically assisted 
reproduction is legislated for infertile, single, unmarried women the judges also 
acknowledged that the same right should be granted by analogy to unmarried, single 
men.  
After the granting of permission fertilized eggs were implanted in a surrogate 
woman (with sperm and eggs donated by third party donors) and thus the above two 
men finally had the children they desired. In fact, by opinion number 261/2010 of the 
Legal Council of the Hellenic State (LCHS)15, it was decided that the surrogate 
mother would be registered as the legal mother of the children in the Public Registry.  
Afterwards however, the Athens CoFI Public Prosecutor lodged an appeal 
against the ruling of the Court of First Instance, through which the CoFI ruling was 
invalidated. The rationale of the court of Appeals ruling, which was based on the 
combined interpretation of articles 1463, 1464 §1, 1458 and 1456 § 1 CC by 
contradistinction, acknowledged that medical assistance requires inability to procreate 
for medical reasons and not biological ones, which means that it acknowledged that 
surrogacy is reserved only for the medical inability of women for gestation.  
                                                          
15 EfAD legal journal 11/2010.1205 
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After the Athens Court of Appeals repealed the ruling whereby court permission 
was granted, the question that arises is what will be the legal consequence of this 
revocation in the kinship relation of the children with their father (the children born 
were twins). Of course it should be mentioned that in this case not only the 
consequence of prior ruling invalidation is in dispute but also the establishment of 
kinship between children and father. According to one opinion the legal bond with the 
father is established based on the presumption of motherhood under article 1464 CC 
which is applicable by analogy of law (or rather mutatis mutandis) in view of the 
court permission granted16,while according to another opinion 17, in view of the fact 
that fatherhood is subsequent of motherhood it cannot be established under CC 
article1464 but either a voluntary or a court acknowledgement is necessary -and in 
fact only notarial consent given by the man before in vitro fertilization can be 
regarded as such (1456 §2 par b CC).  
After all, the revocation of court permission in a sense reverses the application 
of the presumption with retrospective effect18 (ex tunc -from the moment the ruling 
was issued) and therefore the twins have no kinship relation with the father as it also 
happens with the mother, according to prevalent opinions. Therefore they are children 
with no mother and no father. 
According to another opinion, however, the invalidation of the first ruling has 
no retrospective effect 19 or, for all intents and purposes, by revocation of the ruling 
the consequences of the bona fide disbursements made by the agent should not be 
encroached on, according to the provision of article 779 of the CCP. Despite the fact 
that the above article makes mention to financial transactions, there can be an 
application by analogy to personal relations20. Consequently, in accordance with this 
point of view, the children go on having a father, the man to whom permission for 
                                                          
16 Κoumoutzis, The revocation of court permission for in vitro fertilization, Annals of Private law 
ΙΓ/2013 p.552 et seq. 
17 Papadopoulou- Klamari, Reversal or invalidation of court ruling whereby permission to use 
surrogacy was granted, Annals of Private Law ΙΓ/2013, p.549 et seq 
18 Papachristou, Family Law practice manual3, p.273 et seq.` Foundedaki, in CC of Georgiadis- 
Stathopoulos2, article 1465, no. 62` idem , The husband's presumption of paternity in the case of post 
mortem artificial insemination, honVol Manoledaki ΙΙΙ, p. 971/2` Pournaras, in Georgiadis, SEAK 
manual ΙΙ, article 1465, p. 23 in fine. 
19 Κoumoutzis, The revocation of court permission for medically assisted reproduction, Annals of 
Private Law ΙΓ/2013.552 (553), because the constitutionally protected right to family life is encroached 
on (9 §1 par. b  C and 8 §1 ECHR) 
20 Also by Papadopoulou- Klamari, Reversal or invalidation of voluntary jurisdiction decision whereby 
permission was granted to use a surrogate, Annals of Private Law ΙΓ/2013.549 (550) with further 
citations  
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surrogacy was granted, either under article1464 CC or by indirect or by direct 
application of article1456 §1 CC regarding voluntary acknowledgement. Therefore, it 
would be advisable to proceed to an explicit legislative provision with modification of 
articles 1457 and 1458, concerning the required degree of decision readiness of a 
court ruling n so that it can be regarded as irrevocable. 
 
IV. Case of paternity contestation, when children are born inside marriage by means 
of heterologous or even homologous fertilization, due to irregularities in the due 
consent of the medically assisted persons (Ruling 823/2013 Nomos Legal Review, 
Piraeus CoA 328/2009 Isokratis).  
 
In the particular recent case, which was brought before the courts and was 
finally judged by the Supreme Court, the matter regarded the fatherhood of twin 
children who were born inside marriage by means of medically assisted homologous 
reproduction, meaning with sperm from the husband, without however due written 
consent of the two spouses kept in the registry of the medical centre, as it is required 
in accordance with article 1456 §1 par a CC. Because of this violation the father 
claimed in court that the in vitro fertilization was realised without his written consent 
but following fraudulent retrieval of genetic material and that was why he asked that 
fatherhood be contested under CC provision 1471 §2 item. 2. The above provision 
gives the father the right to contest the fatherhood of a child born inside a marriage 
when consent to medically assisted reproduction has not been given by him 
beforehand.  
The Supreme Court, exactly in the same way as the court of appeals21, 
acknowledged22 that the husband's consent on one hand and the agreement on the 
other hand, for medically assisted reproduction, constitute two different legal actions. 
One is an informal internal agreement, which concerns the personal relations of two 
spouses and can be made either in writing or orally, even tacitly in fact, while the 
other is an external contract that is also addressed to third parties, like the doctor 
involved in the process. Thus the former, as an informal acquiescence falls under the 
factual component of article 1471 §2 item 2 CC, which excludes the contestation of 
fatherhood irrespective of the legitimacy of the medical act, which was performed 
                                                          
21 Piraeus CoA 328/2009 Isokratis (Legal Information Bank) 
22 Ruling 823/2013 Law (Legal Information Bank ) 
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without the written consent of the parties involved. However, in the domain of 
scientific theory the opposite opinion is extensively held23 meaning that both the 
acquiescence stipulated under article 1471 §2 item 2, and the consent stipulated by 
article 1456 §1 item b are in fact conceptually identical and therefore, when there is 
no written consent of the parties involved, free from volition-related defects  which 
may regard cases of misrepresentation, undue influence or fraud then, in every case, it 
is possible to contest paternity under CC 1471 §2 item 2.  
Of course it should be highlighted that the court in question had ordered, as a 
means of proof, a medical expert report with DNA testing from which it turned out 
that the fertilization had been homologous, meaning that the sperm used belonged to 
the husband. The matter would certainly have been more complicated if the 
fertilization had been a heterologous, medically assisted reproduction without the due 
written (external) consent. Nevertheless, since the law does not distinguish between 
the type of conjugal consent required for homologous reproduction and that required 
for heterologous fertilization, I believe that there should be a legislative regulation so 
as to explicitly stipulate that consent for heterologous fertilization should be public 
notarial. This is necessary due to the fact that there exist enough court judgements 
already24 mentioning fallacy of the father concerning the agreement made between the 
spouses for heterologous fertilization, where the father often invokes having been 
deceived so that he can establish the right to contest paternity under CC 1471. 
In conclusion I would like to point out that illegal activities in medically 
assisted reproduction, in parallel with the legal ones, constitute an ever-exacerbating 
problem and for this reason some corrective interventions are necessary in the law 
regulating medically assisted reproduction, which has already been in effect for ten 
years. After all, the issues that occur cannot always be tackled on the basis of 
interpretation, while the recent modifications aimed at the facilitation of genetic 
material distribution rather than the safeguarding of kinship for children. I would 
suggest the following as such necessary modifications:  
(a) the mandatory notarial consent of spouses for heterologous fertilization  
(b) the final judgement of the court ruling for the granting of permission for 
surrogacy or post mortem  fertilization- –even with the waiving of legal recourse 
                                                          
23 See Κounougeri- Manoledaki, Family Law5 ΙΙ, p. 143 “… article 1471 §2  section 2 cannot apply, 
unless there exists the written consent stipulated under article 1456 §1 item b” 
24 Athens CoA 2267/2011 Hellenic Justice Review 2011.1455` Athens CoA 1098/2009 Hellenic Justice 
Review 2009.1756=EfAD legal journal Α/2012.596. 
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rights- despite the fact that medical practitioners have been exhibiting haste, since 
they first perform the implantation and then they ask for permission in contravention 
of the law-, and 
(c) the reservation of the practice of surrogacy only for the cases where there is 
a biological bond of the child with one of the two spouses (sperm or eggs) because the 
risk of children made to measure is now becoming more than imminent, if we actually 
acknowledge the permissibility of their adoption at a second stage.  
 
